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Abstract
[This article primarily discusses the links between Saudi Arabian Islamic 
charity organizations and the development of  Salafism in Indonesia and how 
these links facilitate the institutionalization of  Salafi groups. It specifically 
deals with the issues of  how Islamic charity help Salafi groups create their 
institutions and how the Salafis distribute these charities to their own members. 
It also describes how they managed to survive when the flow of  Saudi funds 
was no longer reliable. The primary focus of  this article is on the way Islamic 
charity and Islamic charity organizations respond to existing social and political 
conditions by engaging in social and political activism. International Islamic 
charity organizations have shaped the transformation of  Islamic movements 
over the last decades. Indonesian Salafi groups have benefitted from charities 
in various ways and they have enabled Salafi groups to create their institutions 
in Indonesia. It is no exaggeration to say that Indonesian Salafi groups have 
become the major players in the distribution of  Saudi Arabian charities in the 
country. This process is inescapably linked with politics which further shapes 
the transformation of  Salafism in Indonesia.
[Pembahasan utama artikel ini adalah menjelaskan keterhubungan antara 
lembaga amal Arab Saudi dengan perkembangan kelompok Salafi di 
Indonesia dan bagaimana hubungan ini memfasilitasi penguatan organisasi 
1  Parts of  this articles are based on my dissertation chapter which I defended at 
the Department of  Anthropology of  Boston University on May 2015. I have updated 
some new informations to it in order to be easily understood. 
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kelompok tersebut. Lebih khususnya adalah bagaimana lembaga amal Islam 
tersebut membantu mendirikan yayasan serta membagi dana tersebut kepada 
anggota-anggotanya. Selain itu juga menjelaskan bagaimana yayasan yang 
terbentuk itu bertahan ketika tidak lagi menerima sumbangan dari Arab 
Saudi. Intinya adalah tulisan ini menjelaskan cara kerja filantropi Islam 
dan organisasi amalnya merespon kondisi sosial dan politik dengan terlibat 
dalam aktifisme. Organisasi filantropi Islam internasional pada dasarnya 
telah membawa transformasi gerakan Islam lebih dari satu dekade terakhir. 
Kelompok Salafi Indonesia dengan berbagai cara telah mengambil keuntungan 
dari dana amal ini dan untuk menguatkan organisasi mereka di Indonesia. 
Tidak berlebihan jika disebut bahwa kelompok Salafi merupakan pemain 
utama dalam distribusi dana amal ini di Indonesia. Proses ini merupakan 
hal yang tak bisa dihindarkan dari kaitan politik dimana telah banyak 
berpengaruh pada trasnformasi Salafisme di Indonesia.]  
Keywords: Saudi Arabia, Salafism, Wahhabism, Indonesia, Charity, 
Institution
A. Introduction
In the early 1970s, Saudi Arabia sent its special envoy, Abd al-
Aziz al-Ammar, to Indonesia. He was a student of  Abdullah Bin Baz 
(1910-1999), the Saudi grand mufti and the most respected contemporary 
Saudi ulama. The purpose of  his visit was to discuss the possibility 
of  cooperation between the two countries. In Jakarta, al-Ammar was 
welcomed by Mohammad Natsir (1908-1993), the prominent Muslim 
figure and former leader of  the Masyumi, the largest Islamic political 
party during the Soekarno era. After the dissolution of  the Masyumi in 
1960, Natsir made a deliberate move from politics to social activism. He 
founded the DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia—Indonesian Council 
for Islamic Promulgation), an organization concerned with da’wah (Islamic 
promulgation) and Islamic education.2 Apart from that, he also developed 
international relations with Muslim countries, especially Saudi Arabia, 
and he became active in its international bodies. The al-Ammar-Natsir 
2  On DDII, see Asna Husin, “Philosophical and Sociological Aspects of  
Da’wah: A Study of  Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia”, PhD. Dissertation (New 
York: Columbia University, 1998).
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encounter was extremely important as it shaped the further direction of  
the Islamic movement at home.3 
A few years later, an Islamic college specializing in Sharia and 
Arabic was founded in Jakarta and al-Ammar was appointed as its director. 
Even though there was a controversy about the issue, the college was 
eventually established.4 The college was officially part of  the University 
of  Imam ibn Saud of  Riyadh. In practice, however, al-Ammar had set 
up the whole thing, from its curriculum, students’ admission regulations, 
teacher recruitment, and, most importantly, networking with local Islamic 
organizations. Natsir supplied al-Ammar with students as many DDII 
cadres were urged to study at this college. Promising students were 
given scholarships to pursue advanced degrees in Saudi Arabia. From 
the beginning, being close to Natsir, al-Ammar’s political stand favored 
modernist groups and he hardly involved traditionalists.5 
Apart from working with Natsir, al-Ammar was highly dependent 
on the Hadhrami, local ethnic Arabs originating from the Hadhramawt, 
Yemen, who served as intermediary groups between the Saudis and the 
Indonesian Muslim population. His encounter with the Hadhrami groups 
further shaped the process of  Salafism’s transformation to Indonesia. 
Throughout his career, al-Ammar made frequent travels across the 
country to extend his network and to search for strategic locations for 
establishing Saudi foundations. He married a local woman and had a 
family. In the mid-1980s, he was sent back home and was appointed 
as a high official at the Ministry of  Hajj and Waqf, a Saudi institution 
which channeled donations to Muslim countries. Occupying this strategic 
3 Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in 
Post-New Order Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Southeast Asia Program 
Publications at Cornell University, 2006), pp. 47–54.
4  On the controversy of  the establishment of  LIPIA, see Mujiburrahman, Feeling 
Threatened: Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia’s New Order (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2006), p. 138.
5  Martin van Bruinessen, “Ghazwul Fikri or Arabization? Indonesian Muslim 
Responses to Globalization”, in Southeast Asian Muslims in the Era of  Globalization, ed. 
by Ken Miichi and Omar Farouk (Tokyo: Japan International Cooperation Agency 
Research Institute (JICA-RI), 2013), pp. 47–70; Din Wahid, “Nurturing Salafi manhaj 
A study of  Salafi pesantren in contemporary Indonesia”, PhD. Dissertation (Utrecht: 
Utrecht University, 2014), p. 86. 
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position, his connection with various Muslim groups in Indonesia was 
intensified. He instructed nascent Salafi groups in the country to create 
formal organizations, through which Saudi donations could legally be 
transferred.6 
B. The Oil Revenues and Saudi Arabia Foreign Policies
Saudi Arabia foreign policies on education and the distribution 
of  its charity will not be possible without the oil revenue. It is oil that 
makes Saudi prominent and influential within the Muslim world. Starting 
from Saudi Arabia and then spreading out to the Gulf  States, the oil 
revenues spilled over many Muslim countries. A great amount of  these 
revenues has been used to help fellow Muslims in Asia and Africa who 
lived in poverty or were the victims of  conflicts.7 This marked a new 
era of  international Islamic charity which helped Islamic organizations 
in many parts of  the world to enable them to create their institutions 
particularly madrasa (Islamic schools) and mosques. The abundance of  
Islamic charities facilitated the construction of  madrasa and mosques and 
revitalized their roles within the Muslim community, which had seriously 
diminished in the nation-state period. The presence of  international Saudi 
Arabia Islamic charities facilitated Islamic movements that emerged in 
many Muslim countries. These movements range from those concerned 
with civil rights that were engaged in social activism, supporting the 
agendas of  nation-states which suffered from a lack of  financial or human 
resources.8 At the same time, the presence of  charities also facilitated 
the rise of  Muslim revivalist groups around the Muslim world that are 
concerned with reordering the Muslim community and its religious 
practices based on orthodox Islamic teachings, and with charity funds 
they built their madrasa and mosques and promoted a form of  Islam 
which condemned religious innovations. The provision of  Islamic charity 
thus had far-reaching consequences. In some countries, where the state 
was less effective, it led to the rise of  radical groups professing various 
6  Ahmad Attamimi, interview (20 Mar 2013).
7  Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terrorism in the 
Islamic World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 27. 
8  Hilman Latief, “Islamic Charities and Social Activism: Welfare, Dakwah and 
Politics in Indonesia”, PhD. Dissertation (Utrecht: Utrecht University, 2012), pp. 74–128.
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ideological and political goals. The rise of  Hamas, established in 1987 
in the Occupied Territories with the aim of  liberating Palestine, was 
made possible by the abundant provision of  charity funds. Collecting 
charities from international Muslim communities, Hamas used them to 
erect public facilities such as schools and hospitals. The escalation of  
the conflicts in the Gaza Strip prompted militancy within the Hamas 
factions. This is especially true when it came to have a military wing 
called Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade, in 1991. Hamas was subsequently 
categorized as a terrorist organization by the Western authorities.9 In 
this context, it is important to look at Jonathan Benthall’s argument, a 
British anthropologists who made extensive research on Islam charity 
organization, that Islamic charities “pursued a mixture of  humanitarian, 
religious, political, and sometimes military aims.”10 
The rise of  Salafism is part of  a forceful revival of  religion, which 
marked the turning of  the millennium.11 This fact started from political 
unrest, which occurred in Saudi Arabia in the 1979. In the aftermath of  
the Grand Mosque seizure by religious extremists in 1979, the kingdom 
enforced accommodative Islam. Accommodative Islam is a project in 
which the state uses Islamic symbols to accommodate the religious 
establishment. In return, the religious establishment, or the ulama, 
provides legitimacy for the continuation of  the house of  al-Saud. The 
Saudi state refurbished and renovated religious sites, established Islamic 
colleges specializing on Sharia at home, and distributed educational aids 
abroad.
The institutionalization of  Salafism in Indonesia was made possible 
with the generosity of  Saudi charity contributing especially to the first 
step of  its formation. The returning students who previously studied at 
Saudi universities helped its distribution. Through charities they created 
Salafi communities in the country by forging networks with local Islamic 
9  See, for instance, Ziyād Abū ʻAmr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank 
and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1994); Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000).
10  J. Benthall, “The Overreaction against Islamic Charities”, ISIM Review, vol. 
20, no. 1 (2007), pp. 6–7.
11  José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of  
Chicago Press, 1994).
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organizations. Thanks to these charities, Salafis were able to create their 
institutions, particularly madrasa and mosques, two strategic institutions 
in Islam, through which they could reach wider Muslim audiences. 
C. International Saudi Arabia Charity in the Modern Period
Saudi Arabia is the Muslim country with the largest Islamic charity 
organizations.12 Through its international bodies, it attempts to extend 
its political influence over other Muslim countries as well as to promote 
Wahhabism. It is relevant to note that Saudi Arabia was concerned with 
developments in the Islamic Republic of  Iran which would avowedly 
export its revolution. In response to this, Saudi forged various networks 
with predominantly Sunni Muslim countries to intercept Iran’s infiltration. 
One of  the strategies the Saudi adopted was through charity organizations. 
It has created dozens of  international bodies to channel charities, funds, 
grants, and other forms of  humanitarian aid. It is clear that the kingdom 
used charity as a political tool leading to the rise of  a Pax Saudica while 
it brought the Sunni world in the grasps of  Wahhabism.13 
There are at least three Saudi Arabian organizations to be 
highlighted here: Rabithah Alam Islami (World Muslim League-WML), 
IIRO (International Islamic Relief  Organization), and WAMY (World 
Association of  Muslim Youth). Established in 1962, WML has 
representatives in other Muslim countries. Through this organization, 
Saudi Arabia seeks to unite the Muslim world under its leadership. Its 
secretary general, responsible for administering day-to-day organizational 
policies, at present Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim Issa, has always been a 
Saudi citizen. Through WML, Saudi Arabia challenges the secular NAM 
(Non-Aligned Movement) that seems to have lost its leadership position 
in the post-Nasser era. Its main task is to discuss the manifold problems 
the Muslim world faces particularly on education and public policies. It 
has published and distributed millions of  copies of  the Holy Qur’an 
with an English translation as well as other Islamic books including those 
written by Saudi ulama, all over the Muslim world. Through its consultative 
12  Burr and Collins, Alms for Jihad, pp. 26–47. 
13  Mona Abaza, ‘M. Asad Shahab: A Portrait of  an Indonesian Hadrami Who 
Bridged the Two World’, in Southeast Asia and the Middle East: Islam, Movement, and the 
Longue Durée, ed. by Eric Tagliacozzo (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), pp. 250–74.2009
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commission, which consists of  senior ulama, MWL is authorized to issuing 
fatwa (religious edict) on specific religious issues. In 1974, it issued a fatwa 
against the Ahmadiyah asserting that it is considered a non-Muslim sect. 
Having an international reputation, its fatwa have become references for 
all Muslim groups across the globe. Bearing this in mind, the MWL is 
the most strategic Saudi Arabian institution to control the Sunni Muslim 
world under the guidance of  Saudi Salafism.14
The second is IIRO, which is part of  WML. Established in 1978, 
IIRO is expected to play an important role in humanitarian programs.15 
It has organized humanitarian programs in Asia and Africa, helping 
fellow Muslims who are the victims of  natural disasters, wars and political 
conflicts. Like other Saudi charity organizations, many IIRO officials are 
in fact Saudi ulama charged with offering advice on its programs. As a 
result, programs like Qur’anic instruction are included in IIRO programs. 
It channels financial support to erect mosques and madrasa in Asia and 
Africa. Its roles in Afghanistan gave birth to the rise of  the Taliban, young 
Afghan students who, having completed their studies in Saudi Arabian 
schools became Wahhabism’s mouthpiece. In many countries, IIRO is 
allowed to create local branches, allowing the infusion of  Salafism to 
penetrate even deeper into the Muslim population. In Indonesia, IIRO 
created networks with various modernist Muslim organizations with 
similar religious orientations. 
The last Saudi Arabian international body which exerts strong 
influence on the Muslim population is WAMY. Established in 1972, this 
organization is concerned with Muslim youth and aims to preserve their 
Muslim identities. Part of  WML, this organization serves as a strategic 
institution to win the hearts and minds of  the young Muslim generation. 
Having members in 60 countries, it seeks to guard the young Muslim 
generation from the waves of  Western cultural domination as well as to 
protect Sunni youths from the Iranian-Shiite propaganda. In its heyday in 
the 1990s, it attracted many promising Muslim students in order to hold 
conferences and symposiums, conduct research and execute exchange 
programs. It annually invites students from all over the Muslim world 
14  Burr and Collins, Alms for Jihad, pp. 33–4. 
15  Ibid., p. 35; Jonathan Benthall and Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable 
Crescent: Politcs of  Aid in the Muslim World (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), p. 11. 
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to perform the hajj and the umrah (small pilgrimage). Its presence has 
inspired youth movements all over the world.16
On a second level there are a number of  organizations whose task 
is to bridge the Saudi Arabian government and the Indonesian Muslim 
populations. These foundations have wide networks with local Islamic 
organizations that have become the recipients of  their charity. They 
are run by professionals, many of  whom having degrees in finance and 
economics and have close ties with the royal families. Their appointments 
should be with, and through, the endorsement of  the royal families and 
the Saudi religious establishment. Officials who fail to abide to the rules 
may be fired and deported from the country. There are at least eleven 
major organizations that play important roles in distributing Saudi charities 
in Indonesia.17 Most of  them are located in Java (Jakarta, Yogyakarta, 
and Surabaya), and one is located in Makassar, South Sulawesi. As will 
be shown below, Java has played an important role in the process of  
the transformation of  Salafism in Indonesia. Meanwhile Makassar has 
experienced strong Islamic movements over the last decades. 
At the very end of  this structure are Salafi preachers and teachers. 
They are the last chain of  the transmission of  Salafism among the 
Indonesian Muslim population. Their physical appearance is striking as 
they usually wear the Saudi thawb, having long beards and putting the 
hems of  their pants up above their ankles. According to some sources, 
Salafi preachers, especially those who are attached to Saudi institutions, 
are well paid. For this reason, they can fully concentrate on their jobs 
as preachers and teachers. During the heydays of  Saudi charity, roughly 
around the 1990s, their payments were even much higher than those of  
Indonesian civil servants. In the early 2000s, along with the issuance of  
the contra-terrorism act which hampered the flow of  international funds, 
their payments were significantly reduced. This raised suspicion among 
the preachers and led to fragmentation.18 
16  Burr and Collins, Alms for Jihad, pp. 41–3. 
17  Nidaul Fitrah in Surabaya, al-Huda in Bogor, al-Sofwa in Jakarta, al-Sunnah in 
Cirebon, al-Taifah al-Mansurah in Kediri, Markaz al-Faruq in Jember, Da’wah Islamiyah 
in Rangkas Bitung, Wahdah Islamiyah in Makassar, al-Imam in Sukabumi, Darun Najwa 
in Jakarta, and Eldata in Jakarta. Ahmad Attamimi, interview (20 Mar 2013).
18  Ibid.
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D. Patron-Client Relationship between the Donors and the 
Beneficiaries
The distribution of  charity is highly political. The donors will select 
the beneficiaries of  their charities based on certain criteria. The first and 
the foremost criteria is that the beneficiaries should be compliant and 
supportive to the political interests of  the donors. Based on this criteria, 
the distribution of  charity implies patron-client relationship between 
the donors and the beneficiaries. Through its officials, Saudi Arabia 
charity organizations select and distribute its charities. In the context of  
Indonesia, the Hadharamis have been selected as the beneficiaries as well 
as the distributors of  Saudi Arabia charities. It is widely known that the 
Hadhramis have been intermediaries for a long time. During the Dutch 
colonial era, they had served as intermediaries between the Dutch and 
the inlanders. 
In the context of  the distribution of  Saudi charities, the Hadhramis 
use certain codes to avoid jealousy between those who get the charities 
and those who do not. 
Minna aw minhum? (Are they our friends or their friends?) is an 
expression to denote religious groupings among the Indonesian Muslim 
community. This code has been widely used by the Hadharamis. During 
the 1960s and 1970s, various Muslim organizations widely used this 
expression to set themselves apart from non-loyalists who might destroy 
their organizations from within. It resembles an internal code through 
which internal members communicate with each other. Non-members or 
outsiders who do not know Arabic may not understand the meaning of  
this expression. During the heyday of  politik aliran (politics of  ideology) 
in Indonesia, when tensions and suspicion among social and religious 
groups were extremely high, each created its own secret codes to prevent 
taping by the opponents.19 
During my fieldwork in 2010-2012, I heard this expression again 
from my informant Hifni who previously worked as an official at a Saudi 
Arabia charity organization in Jakarta. Every time he received a proposal, 
he asked his staff. “Minna aw minhum?” If  the proposals were made by 
minna, they were put in different folders for further consideration. If  they 
were made by minhum, they were thrown away. He further explained that 
19  Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened, p. 339.
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this means that minna proposals were made by Salafi organizations. He 
could quickly see whether a proposal was minna or minhum. Most of  the 
Salafi proposals would be favorably considered and granted as long as 
they met the requirements and provided funds were still available. On 
the contrary, non-Salafi proposals would be turned down. 
Syamsuddin, a Salafi teacher and friend of  Hifni’s told a similar 
story. In the early 2000s, not long after he had moved to Bogor, about 
fifty kilometers to the South of  Jakarta, some villagers came to his house. 
They wanted him to help them to build their own mosque. Along with the 
rapid increase of  the population, the villagers felt that it was necessary to 
build a mosque for their own community. This idea had come up a long 
time ago. A local donor had already endowed a piece of  land but due to 
lack of  funds, the idea had never materialized. Syamsuddin told them to 
make a proposal and to complete it with the land ownership certificate 
and some photos. When the proposal was ready, Syamsuddin took it 
to Hifni who just had a brief  look at it and then agreed. In the coming 
weeks, after verifying all the documents, Hifni sent some of  his staff  to 
the location and expressed the foundation’s agreement to building a new 
mosque. He said that although the distance between the new and the 
old mosque was less than one kilometer as stipulated, due to the dense 
population on the site, this requirement could be waved. 
To avoid conflict with other Muslim groups, Salafi foundations 
require that the distance between an old and a new mosque should be 
at least one kilometer. But in practice, this distance can be ignored with 
the presence of, among others, dense populations. According to Hifni, 
the proposal was granted as Syamsuddin had guaranteed it. Syamsuddin 
then promoted Salafi da’wah among the local population. This task 
became much easier given the fact that he was an on-site Salafi teacher. 
Hifni said that many mosques to which his foundation had contributed 
funds, gradually escaped from their control due to the absence of  on-
site preachers. Local populations were generally opposed to Salafi da’wah 
because they did not have appropriate understanding on it. Apart from 
this unanticipated situation, the success of  a fund request was largely 
determined by informal connections, which include shared ethnic origin, 
ideologies, and organization. In addition, more than any other group, 
the role of  the Hadhramis in distributing Saudi charities was extremely 
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prominent. 
E. The Hadhrami Connections
Compared with other ethnic groups, Hadhramis enjoy better 
relations with Saudi officials at least for two reasons. First, Hadhramis 
have a long reputation as intermediaries. Second, both Hadhramis and 
Saudis share many cultural similarities. The term Hadhrami refers to 
people originating from Hadhramawt, an ancient region in southern 
Yemen. For centuries they lived in a diaspora stretching from East Africa 
in the west, through the Indian sub-continent up to Southeast Asia in the 
east. They had migrated to find a better life but also to promote Islamic 
propagation. The Hadhramis are well known for their prominence in 
commerce, religious authority, and statesmanship. In each country they 
created settlements in coastal areas which they then turned into business 
centers, schools, and religious institutions.20
Claiming to be the descendants of  the Prophet Muhammad as 
reflected in their titles sayyid (pl. sada or sadat), they occupy high positions 
in the social order.21 Their lineages, skills, and social mobility ensured 
that their reputation remained unchallenged. Western colonial authorities 
were concerned with the Hadhramis’ prominence. In Indonesia, due 
to their strategic leverage, they had been appointed as intermediaries, 
bridging the gaps between the colonial administration and the native 
Muslim population. One Hadhrami figure who enjoyed a great privilege 
under colonial patronage was Sayyid Uthman ibn Yahya, a Hadhrami 
mufti from Batavia and advisor for native affairs to the Dutch East Indies 
government.22 
The Hadhrami community frequently suffered from internal 
20  On the Hadhramis, see, for instance, Ulrike Freitag and William G. Clarence-
Smith (eds.), Hadhrami Traders, Scholars and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1750s to 1960s 
(Leiden, New York and Koln: Brill, 1997); Eric Tagliacozzo (ed.), Southeast Asia and the 
Middle East: Islam, Movement, and the Longue Durée (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009).
21  Sylvaine Camelin, “Reflections on the Sytem of  Social Stratification in 
Hadhramaut”, in Hadhrami Traders, Scholars and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1750s to 
1960s, ed. by Ulrike Freitag and William G. Clarence-Smith (Leiden, New York and 
Koln: Brill, 1997), pp. 147–56.
22  Azyumardi Azra, “Ḥadrāmī scholars in the Malay-Indonesian Diaspora: A 
Preliminary Study of  Sayyid ‘Uthmān”, Studia Islamika, vol. 2, no. 2 (1995), pp. 1–33. 
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conflicts. This is because it is a highly stratified community, and the sada 
have been, and remain, the most important social and religious group. In 
the beginning of  the twentieth century, the prominence of  the sada came 
to be challenged by non-sada. The latter argued that marriages between 
non-sayyid men and sayyidah women were legitimate. They came up with 
this idea to counteract the application of  kafa’ah which stipulated that a 
sayyidah can only be married by a sayyid. The issue of  kafa’ah led to a long-
standing conflict between the Hadhrami communities in Indonesia and 
deep conflicts between both groups erupted leading to their division along 
social and political lines. The sada created the Jami’at al-Khair, while the 
non-sada created al-Irshad. Both organizations were active in education 
and social activities. In independent Indonesia, both organizations went 
through a period of  serious decline as different political stands and 
ideological rivalries had major impact on the organizations.23 
The venture of  the Hadhramis was continued in the period of  
nation-state formation. A group of  Hadhramis decided to support 
modern Indonesia by establishing the PAI (Partai Arab Indonesia—
Indonesian Arab Party) thus severing their emotional identification 
with their homeland.24 Others maintained their relations with their 
home country and experienced a downturn in 1967 when the People’s 
Democratic Republic of  Yemen (South Yemen) was declared. The 
socialist regime confiscated many Hadhrami properties at home without 
offering any compensation. In the aftermath of  the communist coup in 
1965, many Hadhramis left Indonesia and moved to Malaysia, Singapore, 
or returned to Yemen. The rise of  power of  Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf  States as a new regional economic entity caused new patterns of  
migration, attracting many Hadhramis from all over Indonesia to migrate.25 
The incorporation of  the Hadhramis into the Saudi Arabian state 
was prioritized. Cultural similarities between the Hadhramis and the 
23  Natalie Mobini-Kesheh, The Hadrami Awakening: Community and Identity 
in the Netherlands East Indies, 1900–1942 (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asian Program 
Publications-Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 231–48.
24  Ibid., pp. 139–45.
25  William G. Clarence-Smith, “Hadhramaut and the Hadhrami Diaspora in the 
Modern Colonial Era: An Introductory Survey”, in Hadhrami Traders, Scholars and Statesmen 
in the Indian Ocean, 1750s to 1960s, ed. by Ulrike Freitag and William G. Clarence-Smith 
(Leiden, New York and Koln: Brill, 1997), pp. 1–18.. 
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Saudis made the migration process easier compared to non-Hadhramis 
such as Javanese and members of  other Indonesian ethnic groups. These 
new groups of  Hadhramis met their fellows who had lived in Mecca, 
Medina, and Jeddah for centuries. In these cities, there has always been 
a sizeable Yemeni-Saudi population. Some families such as that of  Bin 
Ladin successfully created their construction businesses in Saudi. In the 
early 1970s, Indonesian modernist Muslim organizations successfully 
approached the Saudi Arabian government to promote its education 
system beyond its territorial border. At that time, the Hadhramis were 
not involved. It had been an exclusive initiative of  Mohammad Natsir, 
the internationally renowned Indonesian Muslim leader. He approached 
Saudi Arabia in an attempt to revive its international bodies and to 
resume support to Muslim groups in Indonesia. Once the connection 
was established, however, the Hadhramis gradually took over the project 
and controlled it for the benefit of  their own groups. 
The success of  contemporary Hadhramis in distributing Saudi 
charities to Indonesian Muslim groups has been going on for generations. 
Sayyid Muhammad Asadullah, born in Batavia in 1910, is a prototype of  
a person of  Indonesian-Hadhrami origin who, in the aftermath of  the 
abortive coup in 1965, sought refuge in a Saudi Arabian state institution. 
After having completed his education and because of  his language skills, 
he worked in the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Jakarta. In the late 1960s, he 
moved to Saudi Arabia and he worked there as a journalist. He travelled 
extensively to Europe, Asia, and Southeast Asia and became what Abaza 
calls “a hybrid intellectual, the go-between different cultures of  the 
Muslim world.”26 Living apart from his relatives who lived in many parts 
of  Indonesia, he regularly visited Jakarta to look up young Hadhrami 
students. He enticed many of  them to study in Saudi Arabia and he 
helped them to find jobs after they had finished their studies. Although 
he was educated within a Hadhrami madrasa, he used to be uninterested 
in Salafism or any other form of  Islamic puritanism. Working in Saudi 
Arabian international bodies, however, he gradually became one of  its 
staunchest supporters, and his political standing can be read in every 
piece he wrote. He believed that Saudi Arabia was a great Islamic country, 
26 Abaza, “M. Asad Shahab: A Portrait of  an Indonesian Hadrami Who Bridged 
the Two World”, p. 250.  
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which had succeeded to the leadership over other Muslim countries in 
the aftermath of  the decline of  the Ottoman Empire.
Another pattern of  a Hadhrami connection may be found in the 
profile of  Salim Segaf  al-Jufri, the grandson of  Habib Idrus al-Jufri, the 
founder of  al-Khairat, an Islamic organization established in 1930 in Palu, 
Central Sulawesi.27 Born in Surakarta, Central Java in 1954, Salim Segaf  
al-Jufri obtained his early education under the tutelage of  his grandfather. 
In 1972, he went to study at the Islamic University of  Medina and he 
specialized in Sharia. Completing his doctoral degree in 1986, he returned 
to Indonesia and became a teaching staff  at Saudi Arabia College (LIPIA) 
in Jakarta. According to Ahmad Zaini, a former college administrator, he 
was among the few Indonesian scholars who were well paid by the college. 
It was clear that the college highly respected al-Jufri’s deep knowledge 
and his sada background, which seems to have been the reasons behind 
his appointment as a key figure in Saudi Arabian international bodies. 
From 1990 to 2000, he was appointed the representative of  WAMY and 
IIRO for Southeast Asian Countries. With this strategic position, he used 
these bodies to support Islamic organizations in Indonesia, many of  
which belonged to the Hadhramis. Based on this historical precedence, 
it is hardly surprising that the Hadhramis were able to dominate the 
distribution of  Saudi charities in Indonesia. Therefore, they shaped 
the transformation of  Salafism, intermingled with the conflicts and 
disintegration pertinent to their history. Factionalism within the Hadhrami 
groups shaped the reproduction of  Salafism and gradually took Salafism 
into another direction. 
F. Salafism Derailed
Even though Saudi Arabia has international charity organizations, 
in general they are poorly administered and managed. There are three 
reasons for this. First, the distribution of  Islamic charity is largely 
based on trust, which is in danger of  being manipulated or misused by 
its recipients. Its distribution lacks preliminary assessments, has weak 
or wrong targets, and has insufficient standard operating procedures. 
27  Martin Slama, “Translocal Networks and Globalisation within Indonesia: 
Exploring the Hadhrami Diaspora from the Archipelago’s North-East”, Asian Journal 
of  Social Science, vol. 39, no. 2 (Brill, 2011), pp. 238–57. 
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Second, in many countries where Saudi charity organizations operate, the 
distribution of  charity is made by bypassing local authorities, which in 
turn leads to the politization of  charity. In Indonesia, while MORA acts 
as the formal representative of  the Indonesian government, its position 
is insignificant. It does not have any authority to inspect or sanction 
fraudulent practices made by charity organizations. This fact causes the 
unfair distribution of  charity funds. Third, the Saudi royal family and its 
religious establishment are in a position to penetrate the operations of  
the organizations. They can appoint or remove their officials and replace 
their managements with new ones that better fit their expectations. 
Over its history, the house of  al-Saud faced three internal opponents 
which could threaten its survival: the royal family, secular groups, and 
religious extremists.28 All these opponents opposed the corrupt behavior 
of  the dynasty through their publications, cassettes, and blogs and its 
alliance with the Western authorities particularly the U.S.. The obvious 
presence of  the U.S. military forces in Saudi territory raised anger among 
the young Saudi generations whose voices were largely unheard in this 
authoritarian regime. They demanded larger political participation and 
freedom of  expression. But so far, the state has still been able to maintain 
social and political order at home even if, to this end, it risked civil rights 
movements. While maintaining obedience at home, the kingdom suffered 
from rebels from abroad. Many Saudi civil right activists living abroad 
launched sharp criticism of  the kingdom. 
In relation to Saudi charity organizations, factionalism within 
the royal family which had become Saudi charity organizations’ main 
donor, makes its management unstable. It is an open secret that many 
royal family members are critical of  the kingdom and of  the extreme 
accumulation of  wealth in the hands of  certain royal family members, 
while, at the same time, the Muslim population in many parts of  the 
world are living under poor conditions. In the 1980s, when various 
parts of  the Muslim world experienced political conflicts, this criticism 
came to be transformed into a political ideology. To help their fellow 
Muslims in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya, adherent to this ideology 
28  Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of  Dissent (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan US, 1999), pp. 41–8.
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created semi-state foundations.29 Apart from distributing charities to the 
victims, these foundations engaged in Islamic militancy by supplying 
Afghan militants with weapons and heavy arsenals to counter Soviet 
bombardments. Young Afghans whose schools were ruined by the war 
were sent to Deobandi madrasa in Pakistan and were educated by Wahhabi 
scholars leading to the rise of  the Taliban. For Bosnia and Chechnya, the 
foundation provided combatants from all over the Muslim world. The 
combination of  charity and Islamic militancy also took place in Southern 
Thailand and the Southern Philippines.30 
The involvement of  pious but militant patrons eventually took the 
Saudi international charity organizations to the brink of  collapse when 
its high rank officials were known to have connections with terrorist 
organizations. This can be seen, among others, in the case of  Ahmed 
al-Amoudi who has family ties with Osama bin Laden. After serving in 
various countries, he was sent to Southeast Asian countries including 
Indonesia. In this region, he revitalized the old militant group led by 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and linked it to Al-Qaida. Its task was to reestablish 
the Islamic state, which was to include greater Southeast Asia.31 This 
organization was reportedly involved in several terror attacks in the 
region and Western authorities listed the organization as a terrorist group. 
This fact nonetheless raised a public impression that the Salafis and the 
extremists, to some extent, are identical. 
Apart from global politics, local politics also shaped the 
transformation of  Salafism in Indonesia. In this case, the dominant role 
of  the Hadhrami-Irshadis in distributing Saudi charity funds and its 
implication to the reproduction of  Salafism deserves some attention. 
In the absence of  a central figure after the death of  its founder, Sheikh 
Ahmad Soorkati, Irshadi suffered from conflicts between moderate and 
puritan groups. Education programs that were the main program of  the 
organization were abandoned. Religious authorities among the Irshadi 
members were diffused at the hands of  petty ulama who, having limited 
29 Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent; Burr and Collins, Alms 
for Jihad. 
30  See, for instance, Bilveer Singh, The Talibanization of  Southeast Asia: Losing the 
War on Terror to Islamist Extremists (Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, 2007).
31  Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix, ICG Report, 
no. 83 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2004).
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resources, tended to compete with each other. Along with the shifting 
paradigm within the modernists, from politics to social activism, many 
Irshadi cadres returned to da’wah and joined Persis, which had a revivalist 
tendency.32 In the early 1970s, the first educated Irshadi cadres in the 
New Order era were born. They were looking for more resources to 
revitalize the organization and they succeeded after their encounter with 
Saudi Arabian patrons. 
More than any other Irshadi cadre, the role of  Farid Okbah was 
prominent. Born to a Hadhrami family, he was raised in a highly puritan 
environment. After studying in a Persis madrasa in Malang, East Java, he 
emerged as a Muslim preacher. He was hostile to local practices usually 
termed as bid’ah as well as an opponent of  the Shiites. It is relevant to 
mention that a small number of  Hadhrami families in Indonesia are Shiite 
and they established their own religious institutions across the region and 
over time, tension with Sunni Muslim groups occurred. After the Iranian 
revolution in 1979, the Iranian government offered various scholarships 
to Shii students to study in Qum. This mobilization led to more serious 
conflicts with their Sunni counterparts. Therefore, Okbah was very harsh 
against Shiism, which he believed not to be an Islamic sect. His anti-Shii 
rhetoric made him quite popular and he was frequently invited by local 
Muslim communities to deliver talks on Shiism. 
In the early 1990s, under al-Ammar’s instructions, Okbah was 
involved in distributing Saudi Arabian charity funds in Indonesia. To 
do this, he contacted his colleagues and they created organizations. 
In Jakarta, they created al-Sofwa, the largest charity organization in 
Indonesia. In Cirebon, West Java, they created al-Sunnah, led by Umar 
Sewed, Okbah’s junior and an al-Irshad activist. In Salatiga, Central Java, 
they revived a local Hadhrami school and turned it into a strategic Salafi 
institution. Thanks to strong financial support, this school is one of  the 
largest Hadhrami schools in the country with a total of  2000 students. 
It is relevant to say that the school serves as a center of  Salafi cadres in 
Indonesia. Ja’far Umar Thalib, another Irshadi cadre, used to teach at 
this school before he left and founded his own Salafi group. Okbah also 
created a yayasan (foundation) in Surabaya, East Java. In this province, 
32  Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of  Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto 
Indonesia”, South East Asia Research, vol. 10, no. 2 (2002), pp. 117–154.
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the Irshadhi still enjoyed strong support from local Hadhramis. From 
Surabaya, the network was expanded to Malang and Jember, in East Java.
G. Changing Urban Landscapes
Over the last two decades, a number of  Islamic organizations 
and the urban Muslim population have co-existed due to their mutual 
engagements. It may be said that the urban landscapes have become the 
places where new Islamization takes place in Indonesia. This process 
is dubbed “urban santrinization”, a sociological term which refers 
to the rise of  urban Muslim communities who are better educated 
and find themselves in better economic conditions.33 They returned 
religion back into the public sphere, and their presence contributes 
to a firm Muslim civic association. The Salafis contribute to, and are 
part of, this development. Given the opportunity to forge social and 
political structures, they largely participate in the reproduction of  public 
discourses. Through this participation, they expect to be able to influence 
decision-making processes and the power distribution pertinent to their 
interests and to maintain their position as a new emerging authority.34
Indonesian social landscapes began to change significantly in the 
1980s. New urban economic centers emerged in and outside Java. The 
first Muslim generations were born that were educated under the New 
Order and they played an important role in shaping public policies. 
They were actively engaged in social transformation and they distanced 
themselves from politics. After the imposition of  the Pancasila as a sole 
foundation for political and social organizations in the early 1980s, many 
Muslim groups shifted from politics to social activism. This shift marked 
the era of  civil Islam, a form of  Islam that promoted larger participation 
in shaping public life. This form of  Islam is deemed supportive for the 
sustainable development of  the democratic system. 
33  On the rise of  urban Muslim communities, see, for instance, Aswab Mahasin, 
“The Santri Middle Class: An Insider’s View”, in The Politics of  Middle Class Indonesia, ed. 
by Richard Tanter and Kenneth Ray Young (Clayton, Vic: Monash University, Centre 
of  Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), pp. 138–44.
34  Dale F. Eickelman and James P. Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 1996).
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H. The Distribution of  Salafi Schools
The distribution of  the Salafi foundations in Indonesia follows 
various patterns. The first is that it follows urban or semi-urban 
settlements. This pattern may be seen in Jakarta and in other major cities 
in the country. The districts of  Pasar Minggu and Condet in the South 
of  Jakarta have been Muslim settlements for centuries. There have been 
local Betawi and Hadhramis who have lived there for a long time. During 
the colonial period, they were the settlements of  the habaib, an honorary 
title for the descendants of  the Prophet Muhammad, where they built 
madrasa and mosques where the local population learned about Islam. 
Nowadays these areas have changed dramatically. In the beginning of  the 
New Order, while still being predominantly Muslim settlements, other 
ethnic and religious groups moved in. Along with the development of  
greater Jakarta, the local population was forced to sell their land and they 
moved to the South where they created the new city of  Depok. A large 
number of  Salafi communities may be found in these settlements. Many 
of  them run small businesses for instance in fashion, Islamic books, 
herbal and other medicines, perfume, cosmetics, and all kinds of  other 
items related to urban life. Some sell homemade halal (lawful) food such 
as cookies, bakso, tofu, and tempeh. They have contributed to the rise 
of  the so-called pro-Sharia economy, a term referring to a number of  
economic activities such as banking, investment, exchange, insurance, 
and retail believed to be based on Islamic conjunctions. 
The presence of  Salafi groups in urban environments attracts many 
people, among others from among middle class Muslims. After gaining 
material wellbeing, they need spiritual enrichment. They meet Salafi 
groups who, having their own TV and radio stations, have better means 
to reach urban Muslim audiences. Based on my observation, many urban 
professionals have experienced a feeling of  being reborn Muslims after 
their encounter with Salafi groups. To mark this spiritual journey, they 
build mosques or renovate old ones in their neighborhoods. This has 
been the case with Haji Jono, a restaurant owner and active member of  
al-Hijaz, a Salafi organization in Depok, West Java. Haji Jono is a typical 
Indonesian businessman who started his business from zero. In the early 
1970s, after finishing his high school in Solo, Central Java, he migrated to 
Jakarta to find a job. After working in various companies, he decided to 
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become a bakso (meatball) vendor and after a while he became successful. 
Then he opened a restaurant and sold a variety of  Javanese food. One 
day, he met members of  a Salafi group who came to his restaurant. This 
meeting marked the start of  a new phase in his life. He learned about 
Islam and he became an active member. He endowed a piece of  land for 
the construction of  a madrasa and a mosque. The madrasa specializes in 
tahfidz, the memorization of  the Qur’an, targeting children aged from 5 
to 12 from poor family backgrounds. 
The penetration of  Salafi da’wah among the urban environment 
was made available by the advancement of  technology. First, Salafis use 
radio, internet and publications through which they could reach urban 
Muslim audiences. This fact makes scholars currently focus on Islamic 
cyberspaces, and so far Salafis have one of  the largest radio network 
in the country to promote their da’wah directly to Muslim families who 
need more programs on Islam. Urban Muslims be they professionals, 
housewives, women, and men, need information on how Islamic ethics 
shapes the family, womanhood, marriage, career, children upbringing, 
et cetera. They also need to know the right procedures for reading the 
Qur’an, performing their prayers and fasting, and a number of  rituals 
that have become the concerns of  every individual Muslim. These needs 
are, to some extent, met by the abundance of  Salafi programs which 
makes them more familiar with the Salafi form of  Islam rather than 
traditionalist Islam. So every time they need a reference, they will try to 
find it in Salafi blogs rather than in classical Islamic fiqh. Second, equally 
important, Salafi preachers are very active in providing religious services, 
while many moderate Muslim preachers seem to compete in order to 
become popular preachers on TV, or to give religious sermons in offices 
or luxurious apartments from which they get lucrative payment. As a 
result, the mosques in the neighborhood are empty leading to takeovers 
by Salafi preachers. 
The second pattern of  the distribution of  Salafi school is that it 
follows the Irshadi-Hadhrami settlements. As I argued above, al-Irshad 
was once strongly supported in the coastal areas of  Java —from Cirebon 
in the west (West Java) to Surabaya in east (East Java Province), and in 
Solo in the center (Central Java) where Salafis had built their institutions. 
Surabaya and Malang on its Southside have the most important Irshadi 
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madrasa. A number of  Salafi foundations were established in these cities. 
Solo should be given some special attention. In this city, Salafism does not 
only overlap with al-Irshad, it also meets the city’s vibrant historical past. 
In earlier days, Solo had been the center of  all kinds of  political activism: 
Islamism, nationalism, and communism. Long before the arrival of  the 
Dutch, it had been the capital of  Mataram, the strongest and the largest 
Muslim kingdom in Java. Solo was and remains the capital of  Javanese 
culture which is syncretic in character. During the celebration of  Ashura 
(the first month of  the Islamic year), there are many Javanese cultural 
events. The heirlooms of  the keraton (palace) are exhibited to the public 
and the venerated white buffalo is paraded around the city. 
It is important to note that Solo has one of  the largest Salafi 
foundations in the country. There are at least four big Salafi madrasa 
in Solo, each having more than 500 students: Imam Bukhari (500), 
Ibn Taymiyya (600), al-Ukhuwwah (900), and Al-Irshad (1200). These 
madrasa were founded by former Muslim activists who used to be active 
in university campuses around Solo. The prominence of  these madrasa 
can be compared with NU madrasa in Jombang and Kediri, the two major 
traditionalist NU strongholds in East Java. They produce Salafi ustadz 
they sent across the country as well as to Southeast Asian neighboring 
countries. 
The third pattern is campus-based networking. This pattern is 
found in Yogyakarta, also called Yogya for short, about 50 kilometer to the 
southwest of  Solo. Yogyakarta is the new capital of  Javanese culture and 
civilization after Solo, also called Surakarta, was defeated by the Dutch. 
Like Solo, Yogya is also a vibrant place, where syncretic Javanese meet 
Islamism; Muslims meet Christians; abangan meet santri. The people in 
Yogya enjoy a great deal of  religious freedom and, as a city of  education 
many campuses are distributed all over the city, attracting students from 
all over Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries. It is obvious 
that Salafis have benefitted from the Yogya environment in a number 
of  ways. First of  all, they enjoy religious freedom. The local ruler has 
guaranteed religious freedom for the entire population. Second, Salafis 
get new recruits from among the Muslim student population. Based on 
my observation, most if  not all of  the leading Salafi figures, are former 
students who eventually left their campuses, as graduates or drop-outs, 
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with the purpose of  seeking “true” Islam. After the Asas Tunggal policy 
in 1982 (the imposition of  the Pancasila as the sole basis for social and 
political organizations in Indonesia), many students sought refuge in Salafi 
groups. They eventually found the ultimate truth in Salafism which offers 
the middle path between obedience to the rulers and the obligation of  
advising them. While Salafis have successfully have built their settlements 
in many places in Java, this does not include Java’s northern coastal areas 
which have remained strongholds of  traditionalist Muslim groups. It is 
worth noting that these northern coastal areas, called Pantura, and stretch 
from Cirebon in the west (West Java Province), Semarang in the center 
(Central Java Province), to Tuban and Lamongan in the east (East Java 
Province), have always been strongholds of  traditionalist Muslim groups. 
In these areas, there are thousands of  traditionalist pesantren and religious 
sanctuaries that have become the main destinations for Muslim pilgrims. 
The domination of  traditionalist Islam in the north coastal areas goes back 
to the process of  Islamization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
when Muslim preachers created pesantren to be the prototype of  traditional 
educational institutions. Over time, pesantren networks developed along 
the lines of  family lineages and marriage connections where descendants 
of  local Muslim scholars created new pesantren. Some regions are even 
dubbed Kota Santri (The City of  Students). As a result of  this, Salafis 
were unable to penetrate into these areas. Meanwhile, in West Java, Salafis 
have established some important madrasa in Bandung and Tasikmalaya. 
It is obvious that their growth is supported by the puritan culture of  the 
modernist organizations. In both regions are Persis strongholds and many 
local Muslim scholars remain loyal to this organization. The arrival of  
the Salafis into the regions in the 1990s revitalized the organization and 
restored its puritan culture. 
The fourth pattern of  the distribution of  Salafi groups is the 
targeting of  specific areas (sasaran da’wah), to which Salafi organizations 
sent their preachers to promote Islam to local communities that still 
adhere to their indigenous religions, or to intercept Christian missionary 
activities. During the New Order, Christianization had been a major 
concern of  various Islamic organizations such as DDII, and this has now 
been taken over by Salafi organizations, which in many respects share 
the same spirit. This is particularly true for the Wahdah, which regularly 
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sent preachers to remote areas in Central and Eastern Indonesia such as 
Kalimantan, Maluku, and Papua. In East Kalimantan, Salafis, together 
with Hidayatullah (established in 1973), an organization focused on 
education, target Balikpapan and Samarinda, the two major cities in the 
province which have experienced rapid economic growth. In Sumatra, 
Salafis create many madrasa in Riau Province, concentrated in Pekanbaru, 
the capital of  the province. There are eight Salafi madrasa/schools in this 
province with more than 1000 students. For decades, this province has 
been one of  the most important migration areas. Meanwhile, in Papua, 
many Laskar Jihad ex-combatants who waged jihad in Maluku in the 
2000s, turned preachers and teachers and established madrasa in Sorong, 
one of  the fastest growing cities in the region.35
It is important to say that the target areas outside Java largely 
overlap with, and use, migration patterns. Over decades, people from 
overpopulated Java have migrated to regions outside Java to look for 
a better life. They work in commerce, plantations, and mining. In 
these new places they create mosques and madrasa, and their need for 
religious teachers is met by Muslim organizations in Java. The DDII 
is very concerned with Islamic propagation in transmigration areas. 
When the Salafis emerged in the 1990s, they followed this pattern. 
Peripatetic Salafi filled the positions of  religious teachers in these areas, 
providing Qur’anic learning for migrant families, a job hardly ever done 
by mainstream Muslim organizations. It is thus pretty obvious that the 
presence of  Salafis outside Java is a continuation of  Salafism in Java and 
has nothing to do with the local Muslim population. It is often said in 
the local communities that Salafis are pendatang (newcomers) from Java, 
not members of  the local population. 
I. Concluding Remarks
 The institutionalization of  Indonesian Salafi groups will not be 
possible without the support of  Saudi Arabia. Through its international 
bodies, Saudi channeled donations to the Salafi groups in Indonesia 
by which they create madrasa and mosques. This is made to counter 
Iran’s propaganda which at the same time campaigned to export its 
Shii revolution. Through madrasa and mosques, the Salafis are able to 
35  Ustadz Badruddin, interview (17 Feb 2011).
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convey their message to Indonesian larger audience. LIPIA is the first 
and the foremost Saudi institution from which Salafism is transmitted 
to Indonesia. Its students and alumni have played significant roles in 
transmitting this model of  Islam to Indonesian Muslim groups. 
Urban middle class Muslims have taken benefits from the Salafi 
da’wa as they learn Islam and how to become good Muslims. On the 
contrary, urban middle class Muslims have given various donations for 
the continuation of  the da’wa. The birth of  urban middle class is made 
possible by changing Indonesian social and religious landscapes. They 
are the first educated Muslim generation born thanks to the education 
project initiated by the Suharto’s New Order. They experienced the so-
called objectification as they raised fundamental question concerning 
their Muslim identities. 
The Salafis establish yayasan (foundation) as a means to distribute 
charities and to extend network with local Muslim groups. In the late 
1990s, the Salafi yayasan were given opportunities to create network with 
local Muslim groups and to select students to be sent to Saudi universities. 
The practice of  charity within the Salafi groups have been very informal 
which makes it overlaps with politics that sometimes go far beyond the 
purpose of  charities. Charities are used to support other Muslim fellows 
in other parts of  the world not only as an act of  piety but as a political 
manuever as happens in many parts of  the Muslim world. 
The roles of  Hadhramai in distributing Saudi charities are visible. 
They are the mediators between the Saudi state and local Muslim 
communities. As a result, there have been a number of  Hadhrami figures 
behind this transformation. With these charities, they are able to establish 
Islamic boarding schools across the country. Most of  these boarding 
schools are spred in Java as weel as outside Java. This particularly occur 
in Yogya and Solo, two cities in Java which have strong puritan culture. 
So the arrival of  the Salafi groups revive this culture. Their presence, 
however, do not cover the stronghold of  the traditionalist Nahdhatul 
Ulama in northern Java areas. Outside Java, they revive the patterns 
previously made by the modernist Muslim organizations which attempt 
to intercept the Christian missionary activities. 
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